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THE VOICE: THE MINORITY
SHAREHOLDER’S PERSPECTIVE
Dov Solomon*
Minority shareholders tend not to participate in the decision-making process
of public companies with a controlling shareholder, and their voice is rarely
heard. Even when they disagree with how the company is being managed, they
prefer to express this dissatisfaction by selling their shares rather than by expressing their voice. Contrary to the prevailing view, this article provocatively
suggests that their voice is important and desirable. On the deontological level, it
asserts that shareholder voice has an intrinsic value that is independent of any
utility it may yield. Corporate democracy and, specifically, minority shareholder
suffrage, legitimizes the exercise of power by the public corporation’s insiders:
the controlling shareholder, directors, and managers. Indeed, the shareholder’s
right to vote is the foundation upon which the public corporation is constructed
and sustained. On the utilitarian level, this article argues that shareholder suffrage is efficient because it reduces agency costs and contributes to the development of financial markets. Given the prevalence of controlled companies, the
unique insights in this article can serve as an important normative basis for policymakers in designing reforms aimed at incentivizing minority shareholders to
exercise their voting rights and use their voice.
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INTRODUCTION
In most countries, concentrated ownership is the common firm ownership
structure.1 Even in the United States, where public companies are generally
widely held, the number of controlled companies is steadily rising due to the
growing tendency of firms to adopt a dual-class share structure.2 This structure
enables a company’s founders to hold the majority of voting rights and entrench their control of the company even after it goes public. The trend of multiple-share classes gained steam in 2004 when Google decided to go public
with a dual-class share structure, granting its co-founders, executive management team, and directors 61.4 percent of the voting power.3 In the years that
have followed, the multiple-share capital structure has become the norm in Silicon Valley among many hi-tech companies such as Facebook.4
1

Most corporations in Europe, Asia, and Latin America have controlling shareholders. See,
e.g., MARCO BECHT & COLIN MAYER, Introduction to THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE
1, 18 (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht eds., 2001) (finding that in 50 percent of non-financial
listed companies in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Italy, a single blockholder controls
more than 50 percent of voting rights, while in 50 percent of Dutch, Spanish, and Swedish
companies, a single blockholder controls more than 43.5 percent, 34.5 percent, and 34.9 percent of votes, respectively); Stijn Claessens et al., The Separation of Ownership and Control
in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 81–82 (2000) (finding that more than twothirds of East-Asian firms are controlled by a single shareholder); Mara Faccio & Larry H.P.
Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365,
378–83 (2002) (noting that only around 37 percent of Western European firms are widely
held); Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 491–97
(1999) (finding from a review of large corporations in twenty-seven countries that relatively
few firms are widely held); Borja Larrain & Francisco Urzúa I., Controlling Shareholders
and Market Timing in Share Issuance, 109 J. FIN. ECON. 661, 661 (2013).
2
Kobi Kastiel, Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in Controlled Companies, 2016
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 101, 110 (2016).
3
Letter from Larry Page & Sergey Brin, 2004 Founders’ IPO Letter: “An Owner’s Manual”
for Google’s Shareholders, https://abc.xyz/investor/founders-letters/2004/ipo-letter.html
[https://perma.cc/5YQK-LMHP] (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).
4
Jeff Green & Ari Levy, Zuckerberg Stock Grip Becomes New Normal in Silicon Valley,
BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2012), http://www.newsmax.com/Finance/InvestingAnalysis/Zucker
berg-Stock-Normal-valley/2012/05/07/id/438187/ [https://perma.cc/XNE4-LSTS] (quoting
Lise Buyer, principal at Class V Group in Portola Valley, California, “It may be everybody
tries [a dual-class structure], because the market seems to be giving everyone a pass.”).
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In a firm with concentrated ownership, there is a major shareholder who
can direct the company’s affairs, known as a controlling shareholder. Studies
show a prominent presence of companies with controlling shareholders in the
United States.5 Concentrated ownership does not refer only to companies in
which the controlling shareholder holds the majority of voting rights, however.
Due to retail shareholders’ rational apathy, which is examined in Part II of this
article, the controlling shareholder exerts effective control over the company’s
affairs even if she holds less than 50 percent of the voting rights.
The standard approach in corporate law is that different governance rules
should be designed for different ownership structures.6 It is therefore surprising
that the phenomenon of shareholder rational apathy, which is discussed extensively in the literature regarding widely held firms,7 has yet to be explored in
the context of public companies with concentrated ownership. This article
seeks to fill the gap in the academic literature by offering an analytical foundation for investigating minority shareholder rational apathy in companies with a
controlling shareholder.
The inherent risk with concentrated ownership is that the controlling shareholder will exploit her power to derive private benefit at the expense of retail
shareholders.8 This can be achieved in a variety of ways, for example, through
self-dealing transactions.9 Directing company activities with the motive of private benefit and at the expense of minority shareholders leads to inefficiency
that causes damage to both investors and the economy as a whole. This phenomenon is described in the literature as an agency problem between the mi-

5

See, e.g., Ronald C. Anderson et al., Founders, Heirs, and Corporate Opacity in the United States, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 205, 207 (2008) (analyzing the 2000 largest industrial U.S. firms
and finding that founder-controlled firms constitute 22.3 percent and heir-controlled firms
comprise 25.3 percent, with average equity stakes of approximately 18 percent and 22 percent, respectively); Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, Founding-Family Ownership
and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500, 58 J. FIN. 1301, 1302 (2003) (finding
that one-third of S&P-500 companies have families as controlling shareholders); Clifford G.
Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377,
1382 (2009) (finding in a sample of 375 U.S. public firms that 96 percent of them have
shareholders who own at least 5 percent of the firm’s common stock. The average size of the
largest block of ownership in those 360 firms is 26 percent).
6
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1267–68 (2009).
7
See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520,
524, 585 (1990).
8
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and
Control (Harvard Law Sch., Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research & Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 7203, 1999), http://ssrn.com/abstract=168990 [https://perma.cc/NV33SGKK].
9
See Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430,
430–31 (2008).
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nority and majority shareholders.10 Controlling shareholders effectively govern
the firm’s assets and influence decisions made regarding those assets. The minority is essentially represented by the controller, although their interests are
not identical and conflicts are likely to arise between them.11
The agency problem is exacerbated by the minimal involvement of minority shareholders in the decision-making processes of public companies. Retail
shareholders tend not to exercise their voting rights at annual general meetings.12 While they are duly invited to the meetings, most refrain from participating. The cost-benefit analysis explanation for this low rate of shareholder participation is that the small number of shares each retail shareholder holds in the
company makes it impossible for her to substantially influence the decisionmaking process; thus, the costs of investor activism are not justified given the
lack of benefit therefrom. The resulting attitude of retail shareholders regarding
the company’s decision-making is described as rational apathy.13 Even when
shareholders disagree with how the company is being managed, they will prefer
to express this dissatisfaction through exit, i.e., by selling their shares, rather
than through voice, i.e., by voting at a shareholder meeting with the goal of influencing the company’s management.14
Considering rational apathy from an economic cost-benefit perspective
sheds light on the different measures taken to encourage greater involvement of
minority shareholders in the decision-making process. The goals of these
measures are to increase the benefits of participation in shareholder meetings
and to lower the costs of this activism. First, the greater a shareholder’s potential degree of influence on the outcome of a vote, the greater her incentive to
10

See, e.g., Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental
Europe, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 117 (2007); Zohar Goshen, Controlling Corporate Agency
Costs: A United States-Israeli Comparative View, 6 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 100–
01 (1998).
11
See Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J. L., ECON., & ORG. 267, 277–80 (1988).
12
See Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the “Absent” Shareholders: A New Solution
to Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 61–66 (2016) (investigating the total percentage of shares that were not voted in each of the matters standing for a vote at S&P 500
companies in the years 2008–15 and noting that retail investors only vote approximately 30
percent of the shares they owned); see also BROADRIDGE & PWC INITIATIVE, PROXYPULSE:
2015 PROXY SEASON WRAP-UP (3d ed. 2015) (analyzing data from 4,280 companies that held
their annual meetings during the first half of 2015 and finding that retail shareholders voted
only 28 percent of the shares they owned, while over 97 billion retail shares went unvoted).
13
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390–92 (1986).
14
Empirical studies show that the mere threat of exit will impact management’s conduct for
the better. See, e.g., Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2445, 2446 (2009); Alex Edmans, Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia, 64 J. FIN. 2481,
2484 (2009); Vyacheslav Fos & Charles M. Kahn, Governance Through Threats of Intervention and Exit (July 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2527710 [https://perma.cc/6VKV-BDJC]
(last visited Jan. 13, 2017); Joseph A. McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The Corporate
Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905 (2016).
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exercise her voting rights. As opposed to an individual investor, institutional
investors representing large groups of investors can concentrate their power and
have a more significant impact on the outcome of a vote in a shareholder meeting. Accordingly, encouraging institutional activism through the active participation of institutional investors in shareholder meetings is believed to reinforce
the protection of minority shareholders’ interests.15 Second, reducing the cost of
voting will increase the willingness of shareholders to participate in the decision-making process. Efforts to this end are aimed at enabling retail shareholders to exercise their voting rights without physically attending the general meeting,16 for example, by facilitating online voting.17 Indeed, given the scope of the
rational apathy problem, the Securities and Exchange Commission has recently
organized a Proxy Voting Roundtable, aimed at finding ways to increase retail
shareholder participation in firms’ decision-making.18
There is a wide assortment of possible avenues for shareholder activism.
This includes engaging in private discussions or public communication with the
board of directors and management, conducting publicity campaigns, calling
for a special shareholder meeting, submitting shareholder resolutions, and even
initiating litigation. This article’s discussion focuses on the most basic form of
activism, namely, the exercising of voting rights at shareholder meetings. Bolstering the voice of shareholders through their voting rights should, in turn,
support other forms of shareholder activism, for example, increasing management’s willingness to negotiate informally with shareholders prior to the voting
at the annual meeting.19
This article does not simply analyze the phenomenon of rational apathy
and the measures taken to minimize it, but it also seeks to scrutinize the assumptions underlying these measures.20 The normative analysis raises the very
desirability of corporate democracy and, particularly, minority shareholder involvement in a firm’s decision-making process. This article addresses this
question from a deontological and utilitarian perspective. The deontological
15

See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical
Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895, 925–27 (1992).
16
The European Union has adopted arrangements designed to ensure shareholder access to
the information relevant to general meetings and to facilitate the exercise of voting rights
without physically attending the meetings. European Council Directive 2007/36, 2007 O.J.
(L 184) 17–24 (EC) [hereinafter European Union Directive].
17
See generally George Ponds Kobler, Shareholder Voting Over the Internet: A Proposal
for Increasing Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance, 49 ALA. L. REV. 673,
674 (1998).
18
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PROXY VOTING ROUNDTABLE (Feb. 19, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxy-voting-roundtable.shtml [https://perma.cc/XA76-MR8
N].
19
Informal dialogue between institutional investors and corporate management or the board
is common in England. See Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2021 (1994).
20
See infra Part III.
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discussion focuses on a new and provocative premise: investor participation in
a firm’s decision-making process has intrinsic value; irrespective of any consequences it may or may not have.21 The main claim is that shareholder suffrage
is a fundamental right and should therefore be granted special status and protection under corporate law. Without the mechanisms of corporate democracy and,
specifically, the shareholder’s right to vote, the exercise of power and control
by the corporation’s insiders—its controlling shareholder, directors, and managers—is stripped of its legitimacy and ideological foundations.22 Under this
approach, it is the shareholder’s right to vote that legitimizes the public corporation as an entity.
On the utilitarian level, this article examines the influence of shareholder
involvement on a corporation’s decision-making process and aggregate welfare.23 Corporate democracy ensures that directors and officers are held accountable for their actions.24 Accountability lowers agency costs, since the
threat of replacement pressures directors and officers to align their interests
with those of the shareholders. This alignment of interests ultimately leads to
greater efficiency and increases financial returns.25 Furthermore, active involvement of retail shareholders in a firm’s decision-making process improves
the quality of the protection of the investment community as a whole, which
increases investors’ willingness to invest in corporations.26 This, in turn, supports the development of capital markets and increases the financial resources
available for production and growth.
This article also considers three claims commonly raised by opponents of
corporate democracy:27 (1) the principle of freedom of contract might restrict
shareholders in exercising their voting rights; (2) retail shareholders are myopic
and focus on short-term profits that lead to suboptimal results in the long run;
and (3) retail shareholders lack expertise and have less information than the
controlling shareholder and managers and, therefore, are likely to support
suboptimal decisions at the general meeting. The discussion challenges these
arguments as unconvincing and shows how they cannot justify preventing retail
shareholders from actively participating at general meetings.
This article proceeds as follows: Part I explains the agency problem between the minority and majority shareholders that characterizes concentratedownership companies. Part II then analyzes the causes of shareholder rational
21

See infra Part III.B.
See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
23
See infra Part III.C.
24
Kastiel & Nili, supra note 12, at 60.
25
See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 783 (2001).
26
See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 442 (2001).
27
See infra Part III.D.
22

17 NEV. L.J. 739 SOLOMON - FINAL.DOCX

Summer 2017]

5/10/17 2:54 PM

THE VOICE

745

apathy, followed by a discussion of the measures generally taken to encourage
shareholders to exercise their voting rights at general meetings, and distinguishes between measures designed to increase the benefits of voting and those
designed to lower the costs. In Part III, the normative question of whether corporate democracy is desirable is examined, along with the common arguments
raised against corporate democracy. The final Part concludes the discussion and
points to the important implications of the analysis for policymakers.
I.   AGENCY PROBLEMS
All corporations must contend with agency problems.28 An agency problem
arises whenever one individual (the agent) manages the interests of another individual (the principal) in a way that impacts the latter’s property, for the agent
will generally not treat the principal’s property as she would her own. The concern is that the agent will act in her own best interests rather than in the best interests of the principal. Agency problems are characterized by information
asymmetries between principals and agents and by conflicts of interest between
them. This asymmetry is usually mitigated through oversight (i.e., monitoring),
and conflicts of interest are forestalled by incentive structures that encourage
the agent to align with the principal’s interests (i.e., bonding).29 Though these
strategies help to alleviate agency problems, the literature shows that no method of oversight or incentives actually succeeds at fully eliminating them.30
There are three different levels of agency problems in a corporation: between shareholders and managers; between shareholders and the corporation’s
other constituencies, such as creditors; and between majority and minority
shareholders, which is the focus of this article.31 Agency problems between the
two types of shareholders are especially acute in firms with controlling shareholders, who pose a risk of using their power for their own private gain at the
expense of retail shareholders. Controlling shareholders, in effect, govern the
firm’s assets and the decisions made regarding those assets. The minority
shareholders are represented by the controller, despite their diverging and likely
conflicting interests.32 For example, contra the interests of other shareholders, a
controlling shareholder could employ herself and/or family members in the
28

For the pioneering work on agency problems, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
29
Id. at 308.
30
See, e.g., Goshen, supra note 10, at 102 n.9.
31
JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., What is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 1,
2 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAW]. For a presentation of the different levels at which agency problems arise and methods
for dealing with them, see JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, supra, at 35.
32
Goshen, supra note 10, at 101.
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company and arrange for excessive salaries. Alternatively, a controller could
lead the company to engage in a transaction in which she has a personal stake,
regardless of whether this is in the company’s best interests. In such selfdealing scenarios, the controlling shareholder derives the private benefits while
the minority shareholders bear the costs. Managing company activities for private benefit at the expense of retail shareholders leads to inefficiency that
harms investors in the capital market and the economy in general.33
Both economic and psychological motivations can account for the selfdealing behavior of controlling shareholders. First, controllers seek to enjoy
company profits without having to share them with other investors, i.e., increase their personal wealth at the expense of other shareholders.34 Second,
since in many cases it was the controlling shareholder who created and built the
company, she tends to relate to it as her private property. Even after the company has gone public, the controller will often regard retail shareholders as minor,
junior partners at best. This makes her likely to continue to feel free to do as
she pleases with the company’s property.
Agency problems intensify when there is a significant disparity between
the controlling shareholder’s equity interests and her voting rights. A lowequity investment that leads to control increases the potential for conflicts of
interest between the controller and retail shareholders.35 Take, for example, a
company in which the controlling shareholder holds 51 percent of the voting
rights but only 5 percent of the cash-flow rights. For every dollar that the company produces in profits and distributes as dividends to the shareholders, the
controller will receive only five cents while ninety-five cents will be divided up
amongst the other shareholders. In such a situation, the controlling shareholder
is likely to use her voting power to pass decisions that will increase her personal benefit at the expense of retail shareholders. For instance, the controller will
prefer to use company profits to pay her a higher salary or management fees
rather than distribute dividends. This illustrates how a disparity between voting
rights and equity interests is likely to exacerbate conflicts of interest between
majority and minority shareholders and encourage the controller to act against
the company’s interests. In addition, empirical studies have shown that this disparity has an adverse effect on company value.36
33

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 26.
For the phenomenon of “tunneling” assets from the firm to the controlling shareholder,
see Vladimir Atanasov et al., Law and Tunneling, 37 J. CORP. L. 1 (2011); Simon Johnson et
al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000).
35
Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Agency Problems in Large Family Business Groups, 27
ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 367, 367 (2003).
36
See, e.g., Stijn Claessens et al., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of
Large Shareholdings, 57 J. FIN. 2741 (2002) (finding from data on 1301 publicly-traded corporations in eight East-Asian economies that firm value falls when the control rights of the
largest shareholder exceed her cash-flow ownership); Karl V. Lins, Equity Ownership and
Firm Value in Emerging Markets, 38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 159 (2003) (finding
34
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A dual-class share ownership structure creates a gap between voting rights
and equity rights.37 A company founder who wants to raise capital without relinquishing effective control of the company can issue different classes of
shares, each with different voting rights. The shares issued to the public grant a
right to residual cash flows, but also grant either inferior voting rights or no
voting rights at all, while the founders’ shares have superior voting rights. By
issuing two classes of shares with differentiated voting rights, founders can
avoid the dilution normally entailed in the initial public offering and hold on to
most of their voting rights, despite their relatively low equity investment. In
this way, founders can entrench their control of the company even after it goes
public. Moreover, a dual-class ownership structure enables founders to pass
most of the financial risk to the investors while maintaining effective control of
the company.
In recent years, multiple-share capital structures have gained in popularity
amongst Silicon Valley companies.38 They have enabled the founders of technology companies that went public (such as Google, Facebook, Zynga,
Groupon, LinkedIn, and Yelp) to retain their control of their companies by issuing special classes of shares that give them more votes than the holders of other
classes of shares.39 These companies have followed in the footsteps of veteran
corporations like the New York Times, News Corp., and Viacom, which adopted the multiple-class share model for their initial public offerings and have for
decades operated with a concentrated ownership structure.40
Yet agency problems between the controller and retail shareholders are not
unique to companies in which the controlling shareholder holds the majority of
the voting rights. Due to retail shareholders’ rational apathy, which is discussed
in Part II, the controlling shareholder essentially exerts effective control over
the company’s affairs even if she holds less than 50 percent of the voting rights.
The controller can vote her entire block of shares in favor of her own initiatives, while the low rate of investor participation in shareholder meetings will
make blocking such initiatives very difficult or even impossible. Thus, deci-

from a sample of 1433 firms from eighteen emerging markets that firm value falls when a
management group’s control rights exceed its cash flow rights).
37
Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual Class Equity:
The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in
CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000). An alternative
way to create a gap between voting rights and equity rights is through stock pyramids, that
is, a chain of companies where each company controls the company beneath it. See id. at
298. The lower cash-flow interest of the controlling shareholder in companies on the lower
layers of the pyramid exacerbates the danger that she will use her voting rights to derive personal benefit at the expense of the company and increases the risk of harm to the investors.
38
See Green & Levy, supra note 4.
39
James Surowiecki, Unequal Shares, NEW YORKER (May 28, 2012), http://www.newyork
er.com/magazine/2012/05/28/unequal-shares [https://perma.cc/W4N3-Z3GL].
40
Green & Levy, supra note 4.
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sions that benefit the controller at the expense of retail shareholders will be advanced and approved, even though she holds less than 50 percent of the votes.
II.   RATIONAL APATHY
A.   Cost-Benefit Analysis
As explained, agency problems in a concentrated ownership company are
exacerbated by the low level of investor participation in the firm’s decisionmaking process.41 This phenomenon has long been recognized and is the product of the separation of ownership and control, which is a dominant feature of
the modern company.42 The investment of financial resources in a company
transfers control of these resources from the investors to the company itself,
which is run by its various agents. Due to the tendency of retail shareholders
not to make use of their voting rights at annual meetings, the control of the
company’s assets is essentially concentrated in the hands of the controlling
shareholder and of management, which is usually appointed by the controller.43
A simple cost-benefit analysis can shed light on the low levels of retail
shareholder voting at general meetings of public companies.44 To begin with, a
public company’s shares are distributed across a large group of investors. This
diffused distribution means that each individual investor owns only a negligible
portion of the company. Since voting power at annual meetings is proportionate
to share ownership, investors holding insignificant portions of shares will have
no real ability to impact the decision making. This lack of meaningful influence
on voting outcomes means that individual investors can derive no significant
benefits from voting and have, therefore, little incentive to vote.
At the same time, exercising their voting rights entails considerable costs
for shareholders. To become informed, a shareholder must invest resources in
collecting information and data about the company and about the specific issue
up for consideration at the meeting. After gathering the necessary information,
which can include complex professional and financial documents, the shareholder must review, process, and understand the data and arrive at an informed
opinion on how to vote. In addition, the shareholder bears the expense of taking
time off from work to attend and participate in the shareholder meeting. Each
of these stages requires an investment of resources by the retail shareholders
and progressively diminishes their incentive to burden themselves with voting.
41

See Black, supra note 7, at 526–29.
For Berle & Means’ seminal work on the separation of ownership and control in public
companies, see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 127 (1932).
43
See Bayless Manning, The American Stockholder, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1485–89 (1958)
(reviewing J.A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER (1958)).
44
See Black, supra note 7, at 584–91 (discussing rational apathy and shareholder’s incentives to become informed).
42
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The minimal potential impact that each retail shareholder can have on voting outcomes makes the investment required for evaluating resolutions and participating in the vote not worthwhile. Shareholders know that even if they devote most of their time and resources to preparing for the annual meeting, they
will not be able to influence the decision-making process. Thus, each individual
investor, acting rationally to maximize her benefits, conducts a cost-benefit
analysis and concludes that the costs of participating in the general meeting are
greater than the personal benefit to be gained. As a consequence, she chooses
not to undertake the burdens of voting and generally abstain from the company’s decision-making process. This behavior is what is commonly referred to as
rational apathy.45
A simple example can illustrate this rational apathy. Say that two alternative courses of action are to be voted on at a company’s annual shareholder
meeting. A thorough analysis of each alternative should lead to the conclusion
that the first course of action will yield higher expected returns, by $200,000.
Susan owns one share of a total of 100,000 shares issued by the company, and
she knows that her vote will be worth only 1/100,000 (or 0.001 percent) of the
total vote at the annual meeting. Additionally, she estimates her personal costs
for gathering and processing the information required for an informed decision
and vote to be $1,500. This cost is much higher than her expected private benefit of two dollars if the better course of action is taken ($200,000/100,000,
which is her share of the total value that would be gained by the firm). Clearly,
Susan, a rational shareholder, would refrain from the costs involved in voting at
the annual meeting.
The passivity that characterizes shareholders also stems from the diversification of their investment portfolios. Given the risks of investing in a single
company, investors tend to spread their capital market investments across many
different companies.46 Diversification neutralizes the dependence on the performance of a particular company, but it also diminishes the incentive to be involved in the affairs of any one company. Moreover, from a practical perspective, a diversified investment makes it impossible for shareholders to be
involved in all of the many companies they invest in, even if they should wish
to do so.
The troubling effect of rational apathy is that decisions passed at general
meetings might not reflect the views of the investors. This has serious consequences in companies with a controlling shareholder with less than 50 percent
of the voting rights. Even though the public investors hold the majority of the
voting rights, their voices are not heard.

45

See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 13 (discussing rational apathy problem).
See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 196–98 (10th ed.
2011).
46
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B.   Managing Rational Apathy
Understanding that cost-benefit considerations deter investors from participating in shareholder meetings is key to identifying effective methods to counter this. The different modes of dealing with rational apathy can be classified
into two categories: methods for increasing the benefit to shareholders from exercising their voting rights and methods for mitigating shareholders’ costs of
voting participation.
1.   Increasing the Benefits of Voting
Clearly, in a public company, an individual investor’s low proportion of
ownership means she has little ability to influence the company’s decisionmaking process and voting outcomes in the general meeting. A coordinated
group of investors, in contrast, could concentrate their voting rights in a concerted effort. However, the economic literature on collective action problems
shows that the costs of organizing investors are too high for this to work.47
One possible way to lower the costs of association among investors is to
obligate institutional investors, who represent large groups of individual investors, to vote at shareholder meetings. Financial institutional investors such as
pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds play an important role
in developed capital markets around the world. This stems from the fact that
they manage public funds on a large scale and conduct much of the activity in
capital markets. Institutional investors in the United States manage huge public-asset portfolios, which have steadily grown from year to year. The amount
of financial assets held by pension funds, mutual funds, and life insurance
companies increased, respectively, from approximately $14.9, $8.9, and $5.3
trillion in 2011 to $17.9, $12.9, and $6.3 trillion in 2015.48 A similar trend of
significant growth in financial assets held by institutional investors has been
observed in other OECD (The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development) member countries as well.49
Moreover, financial institutions play a central role in capital markets. The
proportion of institutional investor ownership in United States public companies jumped from about 10 percent in 1953 to over 60 percent by the end of
2005.50 This trend continued to accelerate during the last decade, so that in the
47

See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971).
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES:
FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS (First
Quarter 2016) 90, 92, 99 tbls.L116, L117 & L122 (2016).
49
See generally OECD, INSTITUTIONAL INV. ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, http://stats.oecd.org/In
dex.aspx?DataSetCode=QASA_7II [https://perma.cc/288W-DHDR] (last visited Mar. 18,
2017).
50
Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United
States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 57 fig.1 (2007).
48
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first half of 2015, “institutional investors held 68% of the shares of U.S. public
companies.”51 Similarly, in other OECD countries, the holdings of institutional
investors in public companies have risen significantly over the years.52
The massive investment of financial institutions in public company stocks
affords them the ability to exercise shareholder influence on firm decisionmaking. Unlike an individual private investor, an institutional investor’s significant portion of the company’s shares gives it far greater voting power at shareholder meetings. Moreover, its relatively higher proportion of ownership reduces the attractiveness of selling its shares on the stock market in the event of
dissatisfaction with the company’s management. A massive exit would lead to
a steep drop in share prices and financial loss for the institutional investor.53
Therefore, continuing to hold on to shares and using its voice to influence the
decision-making process is the more attractive option for the institutional investor.
Institutional investors’ duty of care obligates them to protect the interests
of their clients by participating in shareholder meetings and exercising their
voting rights.54 Moreover, their special status in the capital markets prevents
them from limiting their activities to passive investment in public companies.
In light of the vast scope of the assets they manage, the market in its entirety is
furthered by institutional activism, as manifested in the institutions’ active participation in shareholder meetings and involvement in the supervision of public
companies they are invested in.
The call for institutional activism reflects the view of institutional actors as
an instrument for effective oversight over public companies. This approach expresses the preference for market mechanisms over governmental intervention.
Accordingly, financial institutions should develop effective tools that enable
them to achieve the supervisory goal of institutional activism in the capital
market. In addition to voting at annual shareholder meetings, institutional investors can be active in other areas, such as in financial institutions’ investment
policymaking where greater weight can be given to corporate governance con51

BROADRIDGE & PWC INITIATIVE, supra note 12, at 2.
In the United Kingdom, the increase in institutional investor holdings in public companies
over the last fifty years has led to a decrease in the proportion of retail shareholder holdings,
from 54 percent in 1963 to 11 percent in 2012. Serdar Çelik & Mats Isaksson, Institutional
Investors and Ownership Engagement, 2013/2 OECD J.: FIN. MKT. TRENDS 93, 96 (2014).
Similarly, in Japan, in 2011, institutional investors held the majority of public company
stock, whereas retail shareholders held only 18 percent of all public equity. Id.
53
See Black, supra note 7, at 572–73; John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The
Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1288–89 (1991); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism,
79 GEO. L.J. 445, 462–63 (1991).
54
Press Release No. IA-2106; SEC, Final Rule: Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 17
C.F.R. Part 275 (Mar. 10, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2106.htm [https://perm
a.cc/78DN-7YCN].
52
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siderations,55 in selecting the members of the board of directors in the companies in which they hold shares, and in initiating derivative and class actions.56
One striking example of institutional investor activism is the involvement of
the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”) in the affairs of the public companies in which it invests.57 Overall, institutional activism upholds and safeguards the norms of corporate governance, protects the interests of public investors, and generally contributes to the improved
functioning of the capital market.58
2.   Lowering the Costs of Voting
Time and mobility limitations make it cumbersome for retail shareholders
to participate in general meetings and exercise their voting rights, especially
given that they often diversify their investments across many companies. Since
the annual meetings of different public companies can be held simultaneously,
it becomes impossible for investors to be physically present at the meetings of
all. Furthermore, in the global age, when investment opportunities are not restricted to the investor’s country of origin, physical attendance at meetings is
not feasible in many cases.
To ease the burden of voting for the investment community, voting options
that do not require physical attendance have been developed. For example, it is
possible for shareholders to vote via proxy. Regulation of the proxy solicitation
process is one of the original responsibilities that Congress assigned to the Securities and Exchange Commission in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,59

55

If institutional investors include the quality of corporate governance among their overall
considerations in choosing the companies they invest in, this should directly increase the
demand for good corporate governance as well as effectively force public companies to improve their governance policies in order to raise capital from such investors.
56
For the appropriateness of institutional investors as litigants in class actions, see Elliott J.
Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors
Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995).
57
For empirical research on the influence of CalPERS’ activist policies, see Michael P.
Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS, 51 J. FIN.
227 (1996). For a description of the activism policies of CalPERS, see Governance,
CALPERS, https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/investments/governance [https://perma.cc/SGX
2-DELU] (last visited Mar. 19, 2017).
58
A general approach of institutional activism was recently adopted in the English Stewardship Code. See generally FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE (Sept.
2012), https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Steward
ship-Code-September-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/CU5K-NY7S]. The Code sets forth a host
of governing principles for the engagement between financial institutions and the companies
in which they invest and applies a “comply or explain” mechanism under which institutions
are encouraged to adopt these principles or else explain why they choose not to. Id. at 4.
59
For Fisch’s analysis on the history of the SEC’s efforts to regulate the proxy process since
1934, see Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46
VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1188–91 (1993).
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and over the years, the Commission has developed detailed proxy rules.60 In
addition, in order to provide shareholders with a convenient method of voting,
the major national securities exchanges generally require their listed companies
“to solicit proxies for all meetings of shareholders.”61
However, the shareholder meeting is not only a voting forum, but also a forum of discussion, debate, and persuasion. Consequently, in not being present
at the meeting and using a proxy instead, a shareholder misses the opportunity
to change her mind or convince others during the meeting.62 Nonetheless, due
to the costs involved in physically attending meetings and the resulting negative incentive to participate in the vote, many legal systems allow voting by
proxy, despite its obvious shortcomings, as the lesser of two evils.63 The significant benefits of the proxy system, described as giving “true vitality to the concept of corporate democracy,”64 far outweigh its disadvantages.65
Facilitated by technological advances, an additional voting option has
emerged: electronic online voting.66 The internet provides a convenient infrastructure for increasing shareholder participation in corporate decision-making
processes. Internet technology offers public companies an alternative way to
communicate with their shareholders and enables the creation of an online forum for shareholder meetings, which cuts shareholders’ costs of participation.
60

See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 240.14b-2.
See, e.g., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 402.04(A), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/
LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_5&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Fl
cm-sections%2F [https://perma.cc/BT2J-2TUT] (last visited Mar. 19, 2017); NASDAQ
LISTING RULE § 5620(b), http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/nasdaqtools/platformviewer.asp?
selectednode=chp_1_1_1_1&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F
[https://perma.cc/7EJR-6B7V] (last visted Mar. 19, 2017).
62
A distinction should be made between two types of voting rights. The shareholder’s voting right is a property right that belongs to the shareholder herself, and she is thus free to exercise it by forgoing the advantages of attending a shareholder meeting in person. The voting
rights of members of parliament or of a firm’s board of directors, in contrast, are not property rights, but rather empower their bearers to act on behalf of others; they are therefore not
free to relinquish these advantages.
63
See, e.g., 8 DEL. CODE § 212(b) (2002); MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 7.22(2)
(Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 2005); Canada Business Corporations Act, 1985, c.44, Part 13, §§ 147–
54 (R.S.C. 1985), http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-44.pdf [https://perma.cc/492XBQ3Z]; Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex [German Corporate Governance Code],
§ 2.3.3 (May 2015); European Union Directive, supra note 16, at § 10; Companies Law,
5759-1999, SH No. 189 § 83 (1999) (Isr.).
64
Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated, 404
U.S. 403 (1972) (“It is obvious to the point of banality to restate the proposition that Congress intended by its enactment of section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to give
true vitality to the concept of corporate democracy.”).
65
But see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L.
REV. 1347, 1348 (2011) (arguing that “proxy access would have some undesirable effects . . . and some desirable effects . . . . None of these effects is likely to be very material,
and the net effect is likely to be close to zero.”).
66
See Kobler, supra note 17.
61

17 NEV. L.J. 739 SOLOMON - FINAL.DOCX

754

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

5/10/17 2:54 PM

[Vol. 17:739

Costs are reduced because the internet is an effective and inexpensive means
for transferring data, including documents, and for conducting personal and
group communication among shareholders.
Public companies in the United States and elsewhere have begun voluntarily adopting mechanisms that allow shareholders to vote in annual meetings via
the internet.67 Moreover, in 2007, the European Union advised its member
states to promote the use of electronic voting systems in public companies in
order to raise participation and voting rates of the investing community in general meetings.68
A pioneer in implementing a mandatory electronic voting system for
shareholder meetings has been Turkey, which, in 2012, passed regulations requiring all companies trading publicly on the Istanbul Stock Exchange to allow
shareholders to vote using such a system.69 These regulations were developed
as part of the Turkish government’s efforts to turn Istanbul into a regional financial center.70 The ability to vote at shareholder meetings from anywhere in
the world through a simple internet connection removes entry barriers for foreign investors. Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”)
has also progressed toward implementing a mandatory electronic voting system
for public companies.71 Since October 2012, the top 500 listed companies on
the Bombay Stock Exchange and National Stock Exchange are required to allow investors to exercise their voting rights through an electronic voting system.72 Recently, the Israel Securities Authority (“ISA”) also launched an electronic voting system designed to protect investor interests, which facilitates
easy access and participation for retail shareholders in various meetings of public companies.73 In a press release, ISA Chairman Shmuel Hauser reiterated the
67

See, for example, the eBallot, which is described by its creators as the top electronic voting system in the world. See EBALLOT, www.eballot.com [https://perma.cc/2Q98-VK59]
(last visited Jan. 15, 2017).
68
European Union Directive, supra note 16, at § 8.
69
See Ellen Kelleher, Turkey Moves First on E-Voting, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2012),
https://www.ft.com/content/2a13afde-0e2e-11e2-8d92-00144feabdc0
[https://perma.cc/RHN6-GVLY].
70
Melsa Ararat & Muzaffer Eroğlu, Istanbul Stock Exchange Moves First on Mandatory
Electronic Voting at General Meetings of Shareholders 1, 2–3 (Oct. 2, 2012), https://pa
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2172964 [https://perma.cc/DSH4-3ZMZ].
71
Shareholders Get Online Control, BUS. TODAY (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.businessto
day.in/moneytoday/perspective/sebis-e-voting-rule-allows-more-say-to-shareholders/story/1
86668.html [https://perma.cc/PHE6-45TD] (article alternately entitled Sebi’s E-Voting Rule
Allows More Say to Shareholders).
72
See id.
73
See generally Press Release, Israel Sec. Auth., Israel Securities Authority Launches an
Electronic Voting System (June 29, 2015), http://www.isa.gov.il/sites/ISAEng/1489/1511/Pa
ges/The-Israel-Securities-Authority-Launches-an-Electronic-Voting-System.aspx [https://per
ma.cc/87KP-TRBH]. The Israel Securities Authority, acting as a regulator entrusted with
protecting the interests of investors, initiated the electronic voting system and bears the costs
of its implementation and operation. For investors and whoever calls for a shareholder meet-
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need for this voting option, stating that “it is important for the public who owns
securities to be able to play an active role and exercise [its] rights as a partner
in public corporations.”74
But does shareholder voice really matter? Is corporate democracy, as manifested in the involvement of minority shareholders in the decision-making of
companies with a controlling shareholder, actually desirable? Is the rational apathy of investors in public companies truly a problematic phenomenon that requires regulatory intervention? The normative discussion in Part III addresses
these fundamental issues.
III.   THE NORMATIVE DISCUSSION: DOES VOICE REALLY MATTER?
A.   Voice Versus Exit
According to Hirschman’s conceptualization in his classic Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty, there are two main courses of action available to shareholders that
grow dissatisfied with a corporation’s performance and management: sell their
shares and invest in another corporation (“exit”) or communicate their opinion
by voting (“voice”).75 Exit will influence the share price and signal to both
management and the stock market the investors’ dissatisfaction with the corporation’s decision-making and performance;76 voice will enable the shareholders
to exert influence and change the corporation’s course of action.77
Rational apathy usually causes shareholders to forego the option of voice
or any other form of active involvement and instead to follow a more passive
pattern of investment.78 Due to their limited influence on the voting outcome at
general meetings and the relative costliness of exercising their right to vote, retail shareholders prefer to express their discontent by voting with their feet, i.e.,
by selling their shares, rather than by voting with their hands at the general
meeting. This tendency to vote with their feet has been dubbed the “Wall Street

ing, using this voting system is completely costless. Given the concentrated structure of the
Israeli capital market, which is dominated by a small group of families, it came as no surprise that a public authority, rather than a private actor, initiated this voting system, which is
meant to strengthen the position of public investors relative to controlling shareholders.
74
Id.
75
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 4 (1970).
76
The more shares an investor holds, the more likely her exit from the corporation will result in a significant drop in the share price and thereby inflict financial harm on her. Therefore, the attractiveness of exit declines in direct correlation to the size of the stake an investor has in a corporation. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
77
See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 75.
78
For an analysis of shareholders’ passivity, see Black, supra note 7, at 528, arguing that
“[t]he shareholder impotence argument has been widely accepted by both academics and
regulators.”
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Walk,” referring to shareholders’ inclination to exit whenever they are dissatisfied with management.79
But shareholders’ voting rights are, in fact, often compromised, and their
ability to influence the corporation’s policies and courses of action is limited.
Indeed, these rights, noted Justice Stevens in his dissent in Citizens United v.
FEC,80 are “almost nonexistent, given the internal authority wielded by boards
and managers and the expansive protections afforded by the business judgment
rule.”81 Moreover, retail investors are significantly distanced from the public
corporations they are invested in since most of their investments are executed
through institutional investors.82 Thus, in order to use their voice, retail investors must pressure the relevant institutional investor (pension fund, mutual
fund, etc.) to take action, in the hope that the latter will gain the support of other shareholders.83
Such suboptimal circumstances can aggravate rational apathy. This raises
the question of whether there is any value or utility to shareholder voting rights.
My contention is that voice, which is the foundation of the shareholder’s right
to vote, has intrinsic value regardless of its utility. This intrinsic value is supported by utilitarian reasoning, which will be discussed below, but it is independent of any utility considerations.
It is interesting to note that in a follow-up commentary to Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty, Hirschman explicitly expressed concern that he had been too timid in
his advocacy of voice.84 With regard to public corporations, Hirschman noted
that the relationship between shareholders and management is indeed dominated by exit until the corporation’s activities affect the public interest.85 In the latter instances, rather than take the “Wall Street Walk” and sell their shares in the
corporation, shareholders exercise their influence on the corporation to try to
change its policies.86 My claim that there is intrinsic value to a shareholder’s
79

MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 35 (1995) (“Shareholders . . . can get out
at any time, as long as they can find someone to buy their shares, which is easy to do in
widely traded companies.”).
80
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
81
Id. at 477 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted).
82
Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335,
340–41 (2015).
83
Id. at 341.
84
Albert O. Hirschman, Exit Voice and Loyalty: Further Reflections and a Survey of Recent
Contributions, 58 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q.: HEALTH & SOC’Y 430, 431 (1980).
Hirschman’s words are worth mentioning:
I now find that my advocacy of voice was not exaggerated, but, on the contrary, too timid. This
is not surprising. Since voice is an entirely new category for economists, . . . it will take some
time to uncover all the situations in which the importance of voice has been underrated.

Id.
85
86

See id. at 435.
Id. at 435–36.
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right to vote and that voice, therefore, matters regardless of the circumstances,
offers a novel approach to Hirschman’s voice and exit dichotomy.
B.   The Intrinsic Value of Shareholder Voting Rights
The shareholder’s right to vote, which epitomizes Hirschman’s notion of
voice, is treated by courts as a fundamental right and, consequently, is accorded
special status and protection. In Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp.,87 for example, the Delaware Court of Chancery famously declared that “courts have long
exercised a most sensitive and protective regard for the free and effective exercise of [shareholder] voting rights” and held shareholders’ right to exercise
their franchise to be fundamental.88 But what makes shareholder suffrage a fundamental right? The Blasius court grounded this assertion on purely theoretical
statements.89 Chancellor Allen noted that the right to vote is critical to the “theory that legitimates” the exercise of power by directors and managers over
property that they do not own.90 He continued this line of argument by contending that “[t]he shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon
which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”91
Scholars were puzzled by the reasoning in Blasius,92 with some even dismissing Allen’s statements as ipse dixit.93 However, in MM Companies,94 the
Supreme Court of Delaware embraced some of the theoretical statements made
in Blasius, noting that shareholder franchise can, indeed, be “characterized as
the ‘ideological underpinning’ upon which the legitimacy of the directors managerial power rests.”95 Moreover, the Court urged that the judiciary be “assiduous in carefully reviewing any board actions designed to interfere with or impede the effective exercise of corporate democracy by shareholders.”96

87

Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
Id. at 659 n.2, 663.
89
See Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor Allen’s Jurisprudence and the Theory of Corporate
Law, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 683, 694 (1992) (“Allen recognizes an important distinction between doctrine and theory, as in Blasius, where he explicitly acknowledged the distinction
between arguments that are based on theoretical considerations and those based on doctrinal
considerations.” (footnotes omitted)).
90
Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659.
91
Id.
92
See, e.g., Andrew C. Houston, Blasius and the Democratic Paradigm in Corporate Law,
17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 843, 848–49 (1992) (“Blasius’ legitimacy argument is brief, eloquent
and puzzling. . . . [I]t is clear that Blasius rejects any functional justification of corporate voting. It is less clear what view it proposes to replace it with.”).
93
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Responses, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1749 n.74 (2006).
94
MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003).
95
Id. at 1126.
96
Id. at 1127.
88
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Reference to mechanisms of corporate democracy can also be found in the
Citizens United ruling.97 Justice Kennedy held that the mechanisms of corporate democracy—which are essentially mechanisms of voice—enable shareholders to respond to the corporation’s political speech “in a proper way.”98
Without the right to vote, shareholders would not be able to hold management
accountable for how it exercises its First Amendment rights.99 Kennedy noted
that shareholders use corporate democracy mechanisms to ensure that “their
corporation’s political speech advances [their] interest in making profits.”100
Since the maximization of shareholders’ profits is supposed to be the corporation’s primary goal,101 shareholder suffrage should be regarded as a fundamental right that forms the basis of the corporation’s raison d’être.
Justice Kennedy’s statements in Citizens United should not be interpreted
narrowly. The threat of replacement that directors and officers face given
shareholders’ right to vote incentivizes them to align their interests with those
of the shareholders. This could certainly lead to greater efficiency and increased financial returns.102 But it has an even greater significance: only with
the alignment of the directors’ interests and shareholder interests can corporate
democracy be fully realized.
Some scholars, however, regard corporate democracy and shareholders’
rights to be negligibly efficient or relevant. Bainbridge has claimed that “shareholder[s’] control rights are so weak that they scarcely qualify as part of corporate governance.”103 Even proponents of corporate democracy, who support
greater shareholder power and participation in the corporation’s decisionmaking process, concede that the scope of shareholders’ rights is rather limited.
For example, Lucian A. Bebchuk, a leading advocate of empowering shareholders, referred to the Blasius ruling in an article ominously entitled The Myth
of the Shareholder Franchise and noted that “shareholders do not in fact have
at their disposal those ‘powers of corporate democracy.’ ”104
I propose instead a novel perspective on the corporate democracy debate.
The true extent of the shareholder franchise is, at this point in my discussion,
irrelevant; rather than utilitarian, the legitimacy argument should be viewed as
deontological. Corporate democracy and the exercise of voting rights are not

97

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010).
Id. at 370–71.
99
Id. at 371.
100
Id. at 370.
101
Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A
Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423 (1993).
102
See infra Part III.C.1.
103
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 569 (2003).
104
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 676
(2007).
98
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merely an intentional product or accidental consequence of corporate law.
There is no legal definition as to what legitimacy and “ideological underpinning” are meant to be or to achieve, but rather, the corporation’s legitimacy is
the basis of corporate law, upon which rules should be designed and developed.
A public corporation is at its core founded on the notion of public legitimacy.
Ownership and control may be separated under modern corporate theory,105 but
it is the implicit or explicit consent of the owners of the corporation—i.e., the
shareholders—that legitimizes managers’ exercise of control.106 On purely deontological reasoning, the legitimacy argument mandates that without the
mechanisms of corporate democracy, the public corporation is stripped of its
ideological foundation and, accordingly, its legitimacy.
It should be stressed that the promotion of shareholders’ voting rights—
and, moreover, of corporate democracy—need not be driven by some notion of
civic democracy. “ ‘Democracy’ is a powerful word in America,” and this can
certainly explain why many legal scholars are prone to drawing a parallel between corporate democracy and political democracy.107 Yet, I maintain, it is the
intrinsic value of the shareholder’s right to vote that forms the foundation of
corporate law, not civic notions of democracy.
C.   The Efficiency of Voting Rights
Thus far, the discussion has centered on the deontological rationale for the
shareholder’s right to vote. However, to complete this discussion, utilitarian rationales must be addressed. Indeed, the right to vote is efficient because it reduces agency costs and contributes to the development of financial markets.

105

See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 42, at 119.
Interestingly, in a questionnaire survey on the reasons for increasing retail shareholders’
participation in general meetings, the most prevalent response given by large German companies listed on the DAX30 was ensuring a high level of legitimacy for decisions passed at
shareholder meetings. Bernd Beuthel, Electronic Corporate Governance: Online and Virtual
Shareholder Meetings and Shareholder Participation in Switzerland and Germany 108–09
(June 12, 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of St. Gallen),
http://www1.unisg.ch/www/edis.nsf/SysLkpByIdentifier/3195/$FILE/dis3195.pdf
[https://perma.cc/96F9-Z2KK]. One-third of these respondents chose legitimacy as a reason
for why they view high shareholder participation in their general meetings to be important.
Id.
107
See Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1389 (2006). Rodrigues concludes that a “[c]omparison of
political voting to corporate voting provides a useful vehicle for understanding the characteristics of each more fully. The danger lies in taking principles from the civic polity and applying them to the corporate polity without considering the different context of each.” Id. at
1406.
106

17 NEV. L.J. 739 SOLOMON - FINAL.DOCX

760

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

5/10/17 2:54 PM

[Vol. 17:739

1.   Lowering Agency Costs
Corporations are typically plagued by agency problems.108 Whether between managers and shareholders or between a controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, this can lead to the expropriation of funds and assets,
which can take many forms.109 For example, corporation insiders (controlling
shareholders or managers) might simply steal from the corporation.110 Alternatively, they can over-pay themselves and divert investment opportunities from
the corporation to independent business entities under their full control.111 The
corporation’s insiders might also sell shares in the corporation to a business entity they own below the market price or install unqualified family members in
managerial positions.112 Regardless, however, all types of expropriation amount
to what some scholars describe as theft.113
Obviously, agency problems do not only lead to the expropriation of funds
and assets. Managers might simply steer the corporation away from wealthmaximizing activities in order to avoid risks. Since excessive risk could eventually lead to failure and replacement, managers may promote conservative
business strategies, which will secure their employment but will also deprive
shareholders of potential profits. In contrast, shareholders, due to their diversified portfolios,114 can bear higher risks and are therefore more amenable to riskier business strategies that serve profit maximization.
A commonly held view is that managers in controlled companies are supervised and reined in by large shareholders, who wield control over the corporation’s assets as well as have an interest in maximizing profits.115 However, in
practice, the agency problems in controlled companies may actually be aggravated. To begin with, the controlling shareholder’s interests may not be aligned
with the interests of other shareholders. Thus, she may use her control in the
corporation to advance self-dealing transactions. Moreover, the controller may
be dependent on management’s cooperation to “tunnel” resources from the corporation, for managers are usually in charge of initiating related-party transac108

See Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic Voting as Efficient Corporate Governance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 251, 251 (2014) (“Since Professors Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C.
Means’s classic book of 1932, the agency costs of corporate governance have played a central role in discussions about corporate law. . . . In modern terms, corporations are beset with
agency problems.” (footnote omitted)); see also supra Part I.
109
For a comprehensive account of the many forms of expropriation, see Rafael La Porta et
al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000).
110
Id. at 4.
111
Posner & Weyl, supra note 108, at 252.
112
La Porta et al., supra note 109, at 4.
113
Id. (“[T]ransfer pricing, asset stripping, and investor dilution, though often legal, have
largely the same effect as theft.”).
114
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
115
Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737,
754 (1997).
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tions and submitting them to the board for approval.116 Therefore, in controlled
companies, the main concern is not that managers will promote proposals that
diverge from the interests of shareholders in general but rather that they will
back initiatives that divert value from the minority shareholders to the controller.117 Furthermore, controlling shareholders may lack the incentive to rein in or
monitor managers for personal reasons. For example, some controllers may be
biased in their judgment due to their longstanding relationship with the corporation’s managers.118 Such bias could impair or even prevent any willingness on
the controller’s part to constrain management.
Given these many dimensions of the agency problem, it is hardly surprising
that large sections of corporate law are aimed at minimizing agency costs.119
For example, voting rights can be understood as simply a mechanism for reducing agency costs, for the right to vote improves both corporate governance and
accountability.120 Improved accountability, which often goes hand-in-hand with
greater transparency, lowers agency costs because directors and officers must
strive to align their interests with those of the shareholders in order to avoid replacement.121 This alignment leads to greater efficiency and increased financial
returns, as it serves to neutralize insiders’ ex-ante incentive to self-deal or expropriate funds.122
In addition, lowering agency costs through the mechanisms of corporate
democracy impacts the capital market as well. Agency costs reduce the value of
corporations and, thereby, the total return on investors’ market portfolios.123
Not surprisingly, investors discount the price of shares to reflect the agency
costs, resulting in an increase in the cost of capital for corporations.124 Investors
will apply lower discounts, however, if agency costs are reduced, which will
lead to a lower cost of capital for corporations and thus benefit the market in
general.125

116

Kobi Kastiel, Executive Compensation in Controlled Companies, 90 IND. L.J. 1131,
1142–43 (2015).
117
Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 1295.
118
Kastiel, supra note 116, at 1139.
119
Posner & Weyl, supra note 108.
120
Kastiel & Nili, supra note 12, at 60.
121
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (“Shareholder objections raised through the procedures of corporate democracy . . . can be more effective today because modern technology makes disclosures rapid and informative. . . . With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens
with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their
positions and supporters.”).
122
See Black, supra note 25.
123
Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55
DUKE L.J. 711, 753 (2006).
124
Id.
125
Id.
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2.   Promoting the Development of Financial Markets
Shareholder participation in the corporate decision-making process is not
merely a mechanism of oversight designed to enhance accountability and to reduce agency costs. It also serves to protect investor rights and, consequently, to
boost public trust in the stock market. Shareholder voting should therefore be
viewed as instrumental to the development of financial markets.
Shareholder participation in the decision-making process supports the free
exchange of views and ideas among investors and enables retail shareholders to
acquire knowledge and expertise. Greater knowledge and expertise, in turn,
supports the capital market as a whole. Sophisticated investors, aware of their
rights, maximize general shareholder wealth and prevent expropriation or exploitation by controlling shareholders.
Moreover, safeguarding shareholder rights increases investors’ willingness
to invest in corporations126 and, consequently, expands the pool of financial resources available for production and growth.127 Indeed, studies have shown a
compelling correlation between the protection afforded to investors and the development of capital markets.128 In countries with an investor-friendly legal environment that protects against expropriation by controllers, the markets thrive
and flourish.129 In contrast, countries that offer investors relatively weak legal
protection have smaller and less developed capital markets.130
Shareholder activism and participation in general meetings are clearly important in stock markets where a significant number of corporations are controlled by a shareholder with less than 50 percent of the voting rights.131 In these markets, frequent and significant participation in shareholder meetings by
investors could increase overall public trust in the stock market. As discussed at
length above, one of the dire consequences of rational apathy is that the decisions passed at general meetings might not reflect the views of all the shareholders or even those of the majority of the shareholders. Rather, the decisions
will tend to serve only the controlling shareholder’s positions and proposals
126

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 26.
Development of financial markets is positively related to economic growth. See, e.g.,
Guglielmo Maria Caporale et al., Stock Market Development and Economic Growth: The
Causal Linkage, 29 J. ECON. DEV. 33 (2004); Akinlo A. Enisan & Akinlo O. Olufisayo,
Stock Market Development and Economic Growth: Evidence from Seven Sub-Sahara African
Countries, 61 J. ECON. & BUS. 162 (2009); Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets,
Banks, and Economic Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 537 (1998); Ross Levine & Sara Zervos,
Stock Market Development and Long-Run Growth, 10 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 323 (1996).
128
See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131,
1131 (1997).
129
Id. at 1149.
130
Id. at 1131.
131
For data on the prominence in the United States of companies with controlling shareholders with less than 50 percent of the voting rights, see Anderson et al., supra note 5; Anderson & Reeb, supra note 5; Holderness, supra note 5, at 1378.
127
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even though she holds less than 50 percent of the voting rights. The controller
can vote her entire block of shares in favor of her own initiatives, while the rational apathy of investors will make blocking initiatives that benefit the controller at the expense of retail shareholders nearly or completely impossible.132
Since decisions adopted at the general meeting do not necessarily reflect the
opinions of public investors, the public trust in the capital market is impaired.
Providing investors with legal mechanisms to prevent controlling shareholders
and managers from engaging in self-dealing is, therefore, a prerequisite for a
strong securities market.133
Moreover, minority shareholders’ participating in general meetings and exercising their voting rights are important even in companies where the controlling shareholder holds more than 50 percent of the voting rights. This is especially true following a recent case that strengthened minority shareholder voice
in going-private mergers.134 In M&F Worldwide,135 the Delaware Supreme
Court held that freeze-out mergers structured with dual procedural protections—negotiated by a well-functioning special committee of independent directors and approved by the majority of the minority shareholders—should be
reviewed under the highly deferential business judgment standard instead of the
highest level of scrutiny—the entire fairness review.136 The M&F Worldwide
decision strengthened the voice of minority shareholders by providing a strong
incentive for the controlling shareholder to approve the transaction by a fully
informed majority-of-the-minority vote.137
D.   The Case Against Corporate Democracy
Corporate democracy has many detractors, who claim that the shareholder’s right to vote is an evil and not inevitably a necessary one. Arguments
against corporate democracy range from the theoretical to the economic, with
most of its opponents maintaining that shareholder activism could prevent the
corporation’s controlling shareholder or managers from making sound and efficient business decisions. Thus, it is argued, shareholder activism, through the

132

A distortion of incentives may be created since controllers who hold less (and sometimes
substantially less) than 50 percent of the equity capital bear only a fraction of the negative
effects of their actions on the firm’s cash flow, but they can capture the full private benefits
of their actions. See Claessens et al., supra note 36, at 2741–43 and accompanying text; Lins,
supra note 36, at 159–60 and accompanying text.
133
See Black, supra note 25.
134
In a going-private merger, a corporation’s controlling shareholder attempts to buy the
remainder of the corporation’s widely held shares from minority shareholders using the
mechanism of a “statutory merger.” See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(a)–(c) (2016).
135
Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
136
Id. at 635, 644.
137
See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 528 (Del. Ch. 2013).
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mechanisms of corporate democracy, could impair the corporation’s ability to
maximize its shareholders’ profits.
In this section, I will explore these arguments against corporate democracy,
raising certain reservations and counterclaims that offer a new perspective in
the scholarly debate over the shareholder’s right to vote.
1.   Freedom of Contract Versus Corporate Democracy
Many scholars take a voluntary approach to corporate democracy: managers and shareholders should be allowed to opt out of any limitations on their
freedom of action. This approach’s conception is firmly grounded in freedom
of contract.138 In extremis, advocates of the contractual approach to corporate
law, who view the public corporation as a “nexus of contracts,”139 might be
willing to do away with all constraints and mandatory rules that limit the ability
of managers and shareholders to shape their legal relationship. According to
Daniel R. Fischel, for example, the corporation “consist[s] of contractual relationships freely entered into by economic actors to maximize their joint welfare.”140 From this perspective, voting rights are a mere matter of private contract between the corporation and its investors.141
This contractual approach to corporate law is not flawless, however. First
and foremost, there is no formal contract between shareholders and the firm or
its managers, nor is there consent. Even if we were to accept that a contract is
entered into, it would be in large part a construct of positive law.142 Thus,
shareholders do not formally or consciously consent to giving the firm or its
managers controlling power and discretion through a contract per se. Moreover,
can a contract truly exist among the thousands of individual shareholders of the
modern international corporation, who have never met, speak different lan138

For the pioneering works that laid the foundations for the contractual theory of the firm,
see generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 28.
For the contractual theory of the firm, see generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1–39 (1991); Steven N. S. Cheung,
The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1983).
139
William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 407, 409 (1989).
The new economic theory’s core notion describes the firm as a legal fiction that serves as a
nexus for a set of contracting relations among individual factors of production. . . . Some have
accorded this notion the weight of scientific truth: It has been received in the legal literature as
an ontological discovery with immediate and significant implications for corporate law discourse.
Id. (footnote omitted).
140

Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common
Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 140 (1987).
141
Id. (“Who has the right to vote and how and when the vote can be exercised are rights
that are typically allocated by contract.”).
142
Bratton, Jr., supra note 139, at 462.
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guages, and have different motives and loyalties?143 Obviously, a contract per
se cannot be said to exist in such circumstances, and implicit or explicit consent
on the part of shareholders is just as fictitious.
Second, under the conception of the corporation as a nexus of contracts—
and of every shareholder consenting to contract with the corporation or its
agents—any changes to the corporation’s certificate of incorporation or bylaws
(and, indeed, many other changes to the original consent) must be approved by
all the shareholders, as mandated by contract law.144 However, not only is this
unfeasible, it is also not required under corporate law.
Finally, corporate law already limits freedom of contract. Rules prohibiting
fraud,145 imposing fiduciary duties,146 and requiring approval by a majority of
votes147 are all accepted norms. Thus, freedom of contract is a priori restricted
under corporate law; furthermore, shareholders can even regard these mandatory rules as the true contract upon which their relationship with the firm is
founded.148 As suggested by Joel Seligman, then, given that market forces are
imperfect, the nexus-of-contracts approach to corporate law loses its analytical
value.149
Indeed, some may argue that modern contract law has moved away from
any formal requirements regarding offer and acceptance or consent. Some may
argue that under modern contract law, contracting parties do not need to adhere
to anachronistic notions of formalism. However, the flaws of the nexus-ofcontracts approach are not limited to the narrow definitions and requirements of
contract law or to any subsequent notions of formalism.

143

See Alan Wolfe, The Modern Corporation: Private Agent or Public Actor?, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1673, 1680 (1993).
144
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable
Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1823 (1989) (“charter
amendments, which do not require unanimous consent by all shareholders, cannot be viewed
as a contract”).
145
The Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a–77aa (2012)) imposes various requirements and prohibitions on publicly traded corporations, for example, requiring that they provide investors with financial information regarding securities, id. § 10, and prohibiting fraudulent transactions, id. § 17.
146
For example, see the duty of loyalty under section 144(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, according to which a contract or transaction between a corporation and one or
more of its directors or officers will be afforded protection against challenge if, inter alia, it
is approved in good faith. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2016).
147
For example, see the rules for amending the certificate of incorporation under section 242
of the Delaware General Corporation Law. Id. § 242.
148
Joel Seligman, Essay, The Case for Federal Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD.
L. REV. 947, 949 (1990) (“[I]t is reasonable to assume that most shareholders would view
federal securities fraud and state corporate law derivative actions—rather than a hypothetical
contract—as their basic protection against managerial misconduct.”).
149
Id.

17 NEV. L.J. 739 SOLOMON - FINAL.DOCX

766

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

5/10/17 2:54 PM

[Vol. 17:739

First, prominent scholars who have shown reverence to the nexus-ofcontracts approach admit that it is somewhat flawed. For example, Stephen
Bainbridge has written that just like Newtonian physics, contractarianism does
not provide an accurate representation of reality, and should rather be viewed
as a model that explains only some phenomena—albeit a large and important
set of phenomena.150
Second, and more importantly, the nexus-of-contracts approach neglects to
address important aspects of the modern corporation. For example, some scholars point to the dual nature of the corporation. While a firm is indeed constituted of many voluntary arrangements, e.g., between the management and debtors,
it is also a bureaucratic hierarchy with rules that are not a by-product of reciprocal arrangements.151 The nexus-of-contracts conception captures only one of
these two aspects of the corporation. Adopting a theory that describes only one
aspect of the dual nature of the modern corporation does little to promote the
understanding of the reality of corporate law.152
Finally, even if one should adopt the nexus-of-contracts approach, it is advised to discern its positive propositions from any normative implications. As
noted by Melvin A. Eisenberg, referring to Bainbridge’s insight on the implications of the nexus-of-contracts approach on the role of mandatory legal rules in
corporate law, “[t]o reason from the nexus-of-contracts conception to a rejection of mandatory legal rules is to mistakenly reason from is to ought.”153 Thus,
and even if it is conceived as an accurate descriptive model, the nexus-ofcontracts approach lacks any normative basis—a normative basis that this article strives to put forward.
2.   Short-Termism Versus Long-Termism
A recurring argument against corporate democracy relates to retail shareholders’ investment horizon. While controlling shareholders invest for the long

150

Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique
of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 871 (1997) (reviewing
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (1995)) (“[T]he nexus-of-contracts model is properly viewed
as a metaphor rather than as a positive account of economic reality. Contractarianism is
analogous to Newtonian physics, which no longer claims to be an accurate representation of
the laws of physics, but yet provides a simple model that adequately explains a large and important set of physical phenomena.”).
151
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and
the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 820 (1999).
152
Id. at 829–30 (“To describe and understand firms purely as bureaucratic hierarchical organizations misses the voluntary element of many of the arrangements that constitute a firm.
To describe firms purely as a set of reciprocal arrangements misses the extent to which firms
are organized by bureaucratic rules and operate by hierarchical directions issued by superiors
to subordinates.”).
153
Id. at 824.
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term, retail shareholders are seeking only short-term profits.154 Thus, the latter
have an interest in short-term maximization of the value of the company, even
if maximizing short-term value causes harm to the company in the long run—
so long as the long-term damage is not reflected in the short-term share price,
they do not care. In contrast, a controller cannot hide long-term risk, since selling her controlling block of shares is contingent on due diligence. Therefore, a
controlling shareholder will make decisions based on their long-term impact on
the company.
A commonly held view is that corporate law should not promote the interests of short-term investors but should rather strive to support long-term shareholder value.155 Two prominent judges on the Delaware Supreme Court, for example, have expressed concern in articles about the consequences of investors’
short-termism and urged managers to promote the long-term interests of investors.156 According to this approach, it can be argued that promoting retail shareholder suffrage will lead to suboptimal decisions that are rooted in short-term
interests and will cause harm to the company’s long-term interests.157
However, I contend, this approach does not reflect reality. A significant
proportion of the public’s investment in publicly traded companies is managed
by institutional investors.158 Pension funds and life insurance companies are
characterized by a long-term investment horizon, which allows them to meet
their long-term obligations.159 Empirical studies show that institutional ownership is associated with higher long-term investment, such as research and de154

Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 561, 579 (2006).
155
Hansmann & Kraakman state decisively that “[t]here is no longer any serious competitor
to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder
value.” Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 26, at 439; see also John H. Matheson & Brent
A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation, Relationship Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (1994) (“[T]he raison d’être of large
publicly held corporations is to maximize ‘longterm shareholder’ and corporate value.”
(footnote omitted)); Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital
Investment System, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1992, https://hbr.org/1992/09/capitaldisadvantage-americas-failing-capital-investment-system
[https://perma.cc/3Q6L-AZZG]
(“[L]ong-term shareholder value should be identified as the explicit corporate goal.”).
156
Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 68
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1649–50 (2011); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate
Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless
Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 10, 17–18
(2010).
157
The economic and legal literature discusses critical problems created by short-term interests of shareholders. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and
Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 267–71 (2012); Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch,
What Good Are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2012, https://hbr.org/2012/07/
what-good-are-shareholders [https://perma.cc/M6CB-E66Q].
158
See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
159
Anabtawi, supra note 154, at 564.
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velopment (“R&D”) expenditure.160 One study surveying 2500 companies
found a strong correlation between institutional share ownership and expenditures for property, plant, and equipment (“PP&E”) and R&D.161 Another study,
based on data collected from 129 companies, also found a positive correlation
between institutional ownership and R&D expenditure.162 These findings refute
the premise that institutional investors push managers into adopting myopic
policies aimed at reaping quick profits. Instead, it emerges that institutional investors seek long-term economic results from the companies they invest in.163
Even regarding investors that are more likely to be concerned about the
short-term value of their investments, such as hedge funds,164 it seems that the
criticism of their activism is unjustified. Findings from recent studies have undermined the prevailing view that activist shareholders, seeking short-term
profits, cause harm to the company in the long run. According to Lucian A.
Bebchuk, this view is not supported by the empirical findings, which show that
activist shareholders benefit the company in both the short term and long
term.165 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang conducted a study of
approximately 2,000 activist shareholders’ initiatives and found that they had
improved the performance of the relevant companies not only in the short term,
but also in the five years following the intervention of the activist shareholders.166 Moreover, Jesse Fried has called into doubt the prevailing view that a
firm’s managers should favor long-term shareholders over short-term shareholders.167 According to Fried, managers serving long-term shareholders may
well destroy more economic value than managers serving short-term shareholders.168
3.   No Knowledge, No Vote?
Another argument contesting the desirability of retail shareholders’ exercising their voting rights derives from the common preconception that these
160

Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68
BUS. LAW. 977, 993–96 (2013).
161
Sunil Wahal & John J. McConnell, Do Institutional Investors Exacerbate Managerial
Myopia?, 6 J. CORP. FIN. 307, 310 (2000).
162
Gary S. Hansen & Charles W. L. Hill, Are Institutional Investors Myopic? A Time-Series
Study of Four Technology-Driven Industries, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1, 6, 9 (1991).
163
See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 862–64 (1992).
164
Anabtawi, supra note 154, at 564.
165
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Essay, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1638–43 (2013).
166
Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 1085, 1090 (2015).
167
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J.
1554, 1557 (2015).
168
Id.
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shareholders lack expertise, information, and knowledge relative to the controlling shareholder and management.169 In contrast to controlling shareholders and
managers, who have access to inside and private information about the corporation’s affairs, retail shareholders are characterized by an informational deficiency. Even with regard to information that is in the public domain and accessible to all, retail shareholders lack the motivation and professional skills
necessary to properly analyze the information and to make informed decisions.170 Moreover, retail shareholders, who are less involved in the corporation’s affairs than controlling shareholders and management, are susceptible to
manipulation in their decision-making.171 Actors with ulterior motives or conflicting interests can take advantage of these shareholders’ lack of information
regarding the corporation. This forms the basis to the argument that retail
shareholders might make wrong or suboptimal decisions that will not maximize
their profits.
These arguments, I propose, are not convincing. First, opponents of shareholder primacy and bolstering shareholder voting rights attribute to controlling
shareholders, directors, and managers what seems to be divine wisdom, while
reducing the retail shareholders to an ignorant mass. Yet controlling shareholders and managers, in fact, have no such wisdom, and retail shareholders in no
way resemble a blind mob. In fact, the multitude of retail shareholders may be
wiser than the controlling shareholder or the (few) elected directors. Aristotle
has been attributed with the insight that “the wisdom of the multitude”172—
nowadays referred to as the wisdom of the crowd173—might actually lead to
better decisions than the wisdom of the few. Every individual has her share of
wisdom, and when individuals join together, they combine their shares of wisdom: one individual will understand one part, while another will understand
another part, and between them, they will reach an understanding of the whole.
To apply this to our context, a retail shareholder might, indeed, understand only
one part of a proposal up for a vote, but the shared understandings of all the
shareholders at the general meeting will combine to enable a proper view of the
picture in its entirety and thus lead to an informed and optimal decision by all.
Second, a byproduct of shareholders’ general tendency to diversify their
investments across many corporations174 is that they accumulate and enhance
169

Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 CIN. L. REV. 347, 353 (1991); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 668 (1996).
170
Since retail shareholders are characterized by rational apathy, they lack incentive to gather the information needed for an informed decision and to analyze it properly. See supra Part
II.
171
Gordon, supra note 169, at 354–55.
172
See Jeremy Waldron, The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book III, Chapter 11 of Aristotle’s Politics, 23 POL. THEORY 563, 564 (1995).
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their expertise. Shareholder meetings in different corporations often deal with
similar issues, including rules of corporate governance, which are intended to
promote transparency and accountability in the company. Thus, shareholders,
particularly institutional investors, acquire knowledge, experience, and expertise through their investments in many corporations.175 This then enables them
to make informed voting decisions. Therefore, at least with regard to matters
that are frequently debated at shareholder meetings, managers and controlling
shareholders do not necessarily wield superior knowledge or expertise as compared to the minority shareholders.176
However, even if we accept that controlling shareholders and managers enjoy better access to information and have a higher level of expertise, there is no
guarantee that these advantages will be applied to enhance the corporation’s
decision-making process in a way that will maximize the aggregate shareholder
wealth. Quite the contrary: a controlling shareholder might exploit her superior
information and knowledge to advance courses of action that serve her interests
but conflict with the interests of the corporation or its investors. This better access to information might enable the controlling shareholder or managers to derive private benefit by diverting funds into their own pockets, away from the
corporation and its shareholders.177 Shareholders can exercise their voting
rights to thwart such underhanded maneuvering. In this way, the agency problem between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders will be kept
at bay.
Finally, the arguments against reinforcing corporate democracy reflect an
instrumental approach to the shareholder franchise: namely, shareholders’ participation in the corporation’s decision-making process is desirable only if it
enhances the end result, i.e., leads to better decisions. However, as discussed,
there is intrinsic value to shareholders’ exercising their voting rights, irrespective of outcome.178 Corporate democracy mechanisms and, specifically, shareholders’ voting rights, legitimize both the public corporation as a whole and the
authority vested in its controlling shareholder, directors, and managers. Under
this intrinsic-value approach, minority shareholders should not be deprived of
their right to vote at shareholder meetings due to a deficiency of information,
knowledge, or expertise relative to the controlling shareholder.
CONCLUSION
In his reflections on Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Hirschman considered the
curious nature of voice: “[W]hile normally felt as a chore and a cost which one
175

Black, supra note 163, at 852–53.
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833, 881 (2005).
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tries to minimize or shirk, the activities connected with voice can on occasion
become a highly desired end in itself.”179 This article has made the novel claim
that in corporate law, voice is indeed a highly desired end in and of itself. Regardless of any constraints or consequences, the shareholder’s right to vote
constitutes the very foundation on which the public corporation is built and sustained. Without corporate democracy, the public corporation is public in name
only. Indeed, the legitimacy of the power wielded by the public corporation’s
insiders hinges on the mechanisms of voice and, in particularly, the shareholder’s right to vote.
The discussion in this article has demonstrated how crucial exercising voting rights is in controlled companies. Without corporate democracy, minority
shareholders are represented by the controlling shareholder, whose interests are
not identical to theirs, and may even conflict. This is particularly troubling in
companies in which the controlling shareholder holds less than 50 percent of
the shares, for given the rational apathy of investors, the decisions passed at
shareholder meetings might not reflect the positions of the majority of shareholders.
But this article contributes to the corporate democracy debate not only by
introducing an important insight regarding the deontological nature of the
shareholder’s right to vote. In exploring the consequences of agency problems
and shareholders’ rational apathy, the discussion reveals the efficiency of promoting shareholders’ voting rights in lowering agency costs and strengthening
capital markets in general. The discussion also challenges the arguments commonly made for restricting the shareholder’s right to vote, showing that they
are neither theoretically convincing nor supported by the empirical research.
Since controlled companies predominate in capital markets around the
world, the insights offered in this article should not be taken as solely theoretical. Rather, this article has laid out for policymakers an important and thoughtprovoking normative basis for designing reforms that will incentivize minority
shareholders to exercise their voting rights and make their voices heard.

179

Hirschman, supra note 84, at 432. Interestingly, Hirschman’s reappraisal of the use of
voice was, by his own account, a result of political upheaval: “It took the explosion of protest activities after the Cambodia invasion and the Kent State shootings to remind me that, in
certain situations, the use of voice can suddenly become a most sought-after, fulfilling activity, in fact, the ultimate justification of human existence.” Id.
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